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The Replacement Effect is Wrong

역사회복 2010. 2. 23. 07:17

 

The_Replacement_Effect_is_Wrong.hwp

 

AER's Referee Report.pdf

 

Abstract

 

Reinganum (1983, 1985) suggested the replacement effect. It has been accepted generally. But this common belief is wrong. Gilbert and Newbery (1984) and Yi (1995) say the replacement effect stems from Reinganum model's peculiarity. But Reingaum's replacement effect is only a calculation error. Reinganum considers three cases; the case of leader's success, the case of the challenger's success and the case of all firms' failure. The replacement effect stems from the third case. To consider the case of all firms' failure is a double calculation. It was already considered when the leader developed the present technology.

 

JEL Classification: O31

Keywords: replacement effect, innovation, endogenous growth.

 

 

1. Introduction

 

Now it is believed that, in the presence of uncertainty, the leader always invests less than the challengers in the patent race of a drastic innovation because of the replacement effect. But this common belief is wrong. We can see it by manifesting Reinganum(1985)'s illusion.

 

 

2. The Replacement Effect of Reinganum(1985)

 

Reinganum considers three cases; the case of leader's success, the case of the challenger's success and the case of all firms' failure. The replacement effect stems from the third case. But it is nonsense to consider the case of all firms' failure. There is no replacement effect if we do not consider the case of all firms' failure.

When the firm decides the amount of R&D investment it should consider the prize of R&D. In the situation of the consecutive drastic innovations, the prize of R&D can affected by the success time of the next innovation which is affected by the next race's R&D investment. The period of all firms' failure in the next race is the duration of technology. The case of all firms' failure is considered when the technology is developed. It means that all the participants expect the next race's R&D investment including their own R&D, i.e. they expect the duration of the technology they are now developing.

In Reinganum(1985), we don't need to consider the probability of all participants' failure. It was already considered when the participants of the previous race expected the duration of the technology they were searching. There is no need to reconsider it in the present race. The period of all participants' failure in the next race is the duration of the present technology.

The so-called replacement effect was already considered when the technology was developed. It cannot affect the present race.

 

There is no expectation about the next race's investment in Reinganum's model. Reinganum's model is not complete. So her conclusion, the replacement effect, is wrong. The prize of the patent race cannot be determined if there is no expectation about the amount of the next race's investment. The next race's investment determines the duration of the technology which is pursued in the present race.

Reinganum's replacement effect can be right if the stupid participants who consider the duration of technology is eternal, always win the patent race. The stupid leader considers the case of all firms' failure since the case is profitable to the stupid leader.

 

Let's think inanother way. The cause of the replacement effect in Reinganum(1985) is that the leader's present R&D investment has a negative effect on the leader's present value(the duration of the present technology). Because of this negative effect, the leader's marginal product of R&D is less than that of challenger's, and so the leader always invests less than the challenger.

But this conclusion is right only when the duration of the present technology gets shorter than the leader expected. The leader's R&D has no negative effect on her present value if the duration of the present technology is not shorter than the leader expected.

If all the participants had expected the duration of the technology in the previous race, then the leader(the participant of the previous race) has no need to reconsider that her or challengers' R&D investment of the present race has the negative effect on her present value(the duration of the present technology). It was expected already.

 

Reinganum's conclusion is right if we think only the first race since her model does not consider the expectation of the past. (Of course, this is wrong. We should consider the expectation of the past.) That's why her model seems to be fascinating. But the fascination cannot continue from the second race. From the second race her conclusion is not valid if we assume rational participants. To consider the case of all firms' failure is a double calculation. All the rational participants consider the duration of the technology they are searching for when they develop it. If one were to deny this, her conclusion should be nonsense.

 

 

3. Expectation and R&D Incentive

 

In the situation of the consecutive drastic innovations, the participants should expect the duration of the technology they are now developing, i.e. they should expect the next race's R&D amount. Without this expectation they cannot decide the amount of the present race's investment. Because there is this expectation, we cannot say whose incentive is greater ex ante. The leader and the challenger have the same incentive.

What if the leader's previous expectation is found incorrect ex post? Let's use Reinganum(1985)'s model and add to it expectation. denotes the investment that leader expected. denotes the investment that is realized. is the hazard function.

If [If we interpret her model generously, Reinganum(1985) thinks only this case], the leader's present R&D investment has more negative effect on the leader's present value than she expected. The leader should consider a negative effect on her present value in calculating her marginal product of R&D. So the leader invests less than the challenger.

If , the leader's present R&D investment has less negative effect on the leader's present value than she expected. The leader should consider a positive effect on her present value in calculating her marginal product of R&D. So the leader invests more than the challenger.

 

 

4. Conclusion

 

It is known that the leader has greater incentive than the challenger in a non-drastic innovation. So we can conclude that if it is uncertain whether new technology is non-drastic or drastic, then the leader's incentive is always greater than the challenger's incentive ex ante.

And I want to clarify that even if the leader's incentive is greater than the challenger's incentive, the leader's R&D investment can be less than that of the challenger's because the productivity of R&D can differ between the leader and the challenger.

The so-called creative destruction happens not because of leader's less incentive but because of uncertainty. Many endogenous growth models which assume that the leader has less incentive than the challenger lose their theoretical bases.

 

References

Gilbert, Richard J. and Newbery, David M. G. "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, v72 n3 June 1982, pp. 514-26.

Gilbert, Richard J.; Newberry, David M. G. "Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly: Comment." American Economic Review, v74 n1 March 1984, pp. 238-42.

Reinganum, Jennifer F. "Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, v73 n4 September 1983, pp. 740-48.

Reinganum, Jennifer F. "Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly: Reply," American Economic Review v74 n1 March 1984, pp. 243-46.

Reinganum, Jennifer F. "Innovation and Industry Evolution," Quarterly Journal of Economics, v100 n1 February 1985, pp. 81-99.

Tirole, Jean The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, MA:MIT Press, 1988.

Yi, Sang-Seung "Uncertain Innovation and Persistence of Monopoly Revisited," Economics Letters v49 n3 September 1995, pp. 319-22.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

************ 1.

 

Dear Professor Reinganum.

 

I wrote a note about ’the replacement effect.' I sent my note to AER. My

note was rejected. I conjecture the referee was you. I would like to

refute the referee report in this letter.

 

In referee report you said two possibilities. one is a simple

misunderstanding, and the other is an alternative assumption. I assume

the same model as Reinganum(l985). So I refute only your assertion that

I have a simple misunderstanding.

 

You say

 

"In fact the equilibrium value of the current race, which is Vw, is

determined by the current race’ s equilibrium investment, not the next

race’s investment. But the "prize" in the current race, which is

continuation value of Vw, is determined by the next race's investment.

If the author is confused and thinks Vw--or, more pointedly, the

expected (discounted) duration of the current stage -- is determined by

the next race's investment, this could perhaps explain why s/he does not

believe Reinganum's result. The expected (discounted) duration of the

current stage is most definitely determined by current investment"

 

My Refutation

 

You say "The expected (discounted) duration of the current stage is most

definitely determin어 by current investment." In fact current investment

determines the beginning time. But the ending time(i.e. the beginning

time of the next race) is determined by the next race's investment. So

the expected (discounted) duration of the current stage is most

definitely determined by current and next investment.

 

The prize of the patent race cannot be determined if there is no

expectation about the amount of the next race's investment. The next

race's investment determines the duration of the technology which is

pursu어 in the present race. The replacement effect was already

considered when the technology was developed. It cannot affect the

present race. In Reinganun1(l985) we don't need to consider the

probability of all participants' failure.

 

And what determines R&D is not Vw but the 'prize' of winning if we

distinguish between Vw and the ’prize’ as Reinganum insists.

 

I would be very pleased if you reply to my refutation.

 

Sincerely,

 

June 28. 1998.

Seonghun Cho

 

******************** 2.

 

July 3,1998

 

Dear Mr. Cho.

 

Thank you for your letter. In your paper, you say that "The root cause

of the replacement effect.... is that the leader's present R&D

investment has a negative effect on the leader's present value(the

duration of the present technology)." This is a correct assessment of

what occurs in my model. However, you do not believe this analysis is

correct, but I don't understand why.

 

You correctly point out that "The next race's investment determines the

duration of the technology which is pursued in the present race." An

immediate corollary of this is that the current race's investment

determines the duration of the technology which was pursued in the

previous race(and which is now being used for the duration of the

current race). In other words, the duration of the current race is

determined by the current investment, which governs the arrival time of

the next technology (the one which is currently being pursued).

 

In the second page of your letter, you say "current investment

determines the beginning time" of the current race. This is not correct;

the beginning time of the current race was the random date of discovery

of the technology currently in use, which was governed (stochastically)

by the investment rates in the previous stage. And the ending time (the

beginning of the next race) will be the random date of discovery of the

technology currently being pursued, which is governed (stochastically)

by the investment rates in the current stage.

 

I can only suggest that you do the analysis for yourself, perhaps

beginning with a single innovation as in my 1993 AER paper. See also the

paper by Lee and Wilde, who use the same formulation (perhaps their

development of the payoff functions is clearer than mine). With one

innovation, the only difference between my model and Lee and Wilde’ s is

that their is a flow revenue R in addition to the flow cost x. This is

sufficient to generate the replacement effect.

 

Sincerely,

 

Jennifer F. Reinganum

 

 

******************* 3.

 

Dear professor Reinganum

 

Thank you very much for your reply. But I still think you do not

understand my assertion.

 

You say "The duration of the current race is determined by the current

investment, which governs the arrival time of the next technology(the

one which is currently being pursued)."

 

You say only about the ending time of the current technology. But any

investment should consider the duration of the technology which it

pursues.

 

To determine the current investment, we should consider both the arrival

time of the next technology and the ending time of the next technology

which is determined by the next race's investment.

 

So the expected duration of the next technology is most definitely

determined by current and next investment.

 

The prize of the patent race cannot be determined if there is no

expectation about the amount of the next race's investment. The next

race's investment determines the duration of the technology which is

pursued in the present race. The replacement effect was already

considered when the technology was developed. It cannot affect the

present race. In Reinganum(l985) we don't need to consider the

probability of all participants' failure.

 

I say about EXPECTATION. You do not consider EXPECTATION.

 

Thank you very much.

 

Sincerely,

 

July 27 1998

 

Seonghun Cho

 

 

***************** 4.

 

Subject: Re: Replacement Effect

 

Date: Wed, 29 Jul 1998 09:42:59 -0500 (CDT)

 

From: reingajf@ctrvax. V anderbilt.Edu (Jennifer Reing anum)

 

To: cho <chose@ucs.orst.edu>

 

 

 

 

Dear Mr. Cho

 

The hazard function which governs the duration of the current

technology is a function only of current investment; that is, h (x),

where x

is the investment rate in the current race. The ***optimal*** value of

current investment is (in equilibrium) a function of the other

parameters of

the model, including the continuation values of winning and losing the

current race (this is the expected discounted value of all the

subsequent races); that is, x* = f(vL, vW), where vL is the continuation value

after losing the current race and vW is the continuation value after winning

the current race. The next race's investment affects the duration of the

current technology only through these continuation values, not directly

through the hazard function for the current race. Since no

precommitments can be made, these continuation values summarize all relevant

information about future investments, and are taken as given (not subject to choice)

in the current stage. I believe that these continuation values are the

expectations to which you refer. Yes, one needs to determine these

expectations in order to calculate the optimal current investment rate;

this is done through dynamic programming backwards from the "last" race.

 

Sincerely,

Jennifer F. Reinganum

 

 

******************* 5.

 

Dear professor Reinganum

 

You are right if the present leader is stupid leader. Stupid leader had

thought its present technology would be eternal when it develoPed new

technology. So the present stupid leader should consider the probabiliη

of 외1 participants' failure(duration of the present technology) now.

 

For you to be right, there should be stupid participants and they should

win the patent race always.

 

But we cannot premise stupid participants. We should premise rational

participants. Rational participants consider the duration of the

technology which they are pursuing. So they had already considered the

probability of all participants' failure when they developed new

technology.

 

In the situation of the consecutive drastic innovations, the

participants should expect the duration of the technology they are now

developing, i.e. they should expect the next race’s R&D amount. Without

this expectation they cannot decide the amount of the present race's

investment. Because there is this expectation, we cannot say whose

incentive is greater ex ante. The leader and the challenger have the

same incentive.

 

Let me give you a simple example.

Intel develops 286, 386, 486 ...... Let's assume that the present

technology is 286 and participants are pursuing 386. Intel had already

considered the duration of 286. Intel has no need to consider that its

investment for 386 has a negative effect to its profit from 286. Because

Intel had expected it. Intel expected the duration of 286 by expecting

the total(its and challenger's) investment for 386.

 

Thanks again for your kind reply.

 

Sincerely,

 

7. 30. 98.

 

Seonghun Cho

 

 

 

************************ 6.

 

Subject: replacement effect

Date: Tue, 04 Aug 1998 09:05:24 -0500 (CDT)

From: reingajf@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu (Jennifer Reinganum)

To: chose@ucs.orst.edu

 

 

Dear Mr. Cho:

 

All of the participants in the game are fully rational. At each

stage, they base their investment in the current race on the expected

value

of the continuation game, which incorporates the expected future

durations

of the innovation they are now pursing and all subsequent innovations.

However, the duration of the current race is a function of current

investment (which is, in equilibrium, a function of the continuation

values). Dynamic programming is the method by which these expectations are

computed. I suggest that you write down a two-innovation sequence of patent

races and use dynamic programming to analyze the problem, beginning from the

end and working backward. Indeed, the effect can be found simply by

analyzing a one-innovation problem, if you assume that one of the firms

receives flow profits from a previous innovation (as in my AER 1984 paper).

Sincerely,

Jennifer F. Reinganum

 

 

************************* 7.

 

Dear professor Reinganum

 

If all of the participants in the game are fully rational, they have no need to

consider the probability of all participants' failure(duration of the present

technology). They had already considered the probability of all participants'

failure when they developed new technology.

 

The duration of the current race is a function of current and expected next

investment.

 

You say

********

I suggest that you write down a two-innovation sequence of patent races

and use dynamic programming to analyze the problem, beginning from the end

and working backward. Indeed, the effect can be found simply by analyzing a

one-innovation problem, if you assume that one of the firms receives flow

profits from a previous innovation (as in my AER 1984 paper).

********

 

I know what you are saying. But the present is the result of the past. You

do not consider the expectation of the past. I write again. If all of the

participants in the game are fully rational, they have no need to consider the

probability of all participants' failure(duration of the present technology) AGAIN.

 

Thanks.

 

Sincerely,

8.4.98.

 

Seonghun Cho

 

 

********************** 8.

 

Subject: About Replacement Effect

Date: Wed, 05 Aug 1998 07:24:27 -0700

From: cho <chose@ucs.orst.edu>

To: Jennifer Reinganum <reingajf@ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu>

References: 1

 

 

Dear professor Reinganum

 

What does the firm consider when it does R&D? Of course, the cost and

the benefit. What is the cost of R&D? The cost is the present value of the

whole investment of the development PERIOD. The benefit is the present value

of the whole profit of the technology's DURA TION. Instantaneous cost and

profit is not the things the firm considers.

 

So the duration of the current race is a function of current and expected

next investment.

 

Thanks.

Sincerely, Seonghun Cho

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

**********************************

 

I want to refute Reinganum's assertion more.

 

1. What is Vw in Reinganum's model?

 

In her paper p.85.

****

This is because the continuation values, Vw, Vl, are independent of actions taken in

the current stage.

***********

 

She said "Vw is continuation value and it is independent of actions taken in the current

stage."

 

In her first letter (referee report)

*********

"In fact the equilibrium value of the current race, which is VW, is determined by the

current race's equilibrium investment, not the next race's investment. But the "prize" in the

current race, which is continuation value of VW, is determined by the next race's

investment. If the author is confused and thinks VW --or, more pointedly, the expected

(discounted) duration of the current stage -- is determined by the next race’s

investment,

this could perhaps explain why s/he does not believe Reinganum's result. The expected

(discounted) duration of the current stage is most definitely determined by current

investment"

**************

 

She said "Vw is determined by the CURRENT race's equilibrium investment, not the

next race's investment." This is contradictory to her assertion that Vw is independent of

actions taken in the current stage.

 

And she said " Vw is the expected DURATION of the current stage." This is

contradictory to the fact that she call Vw continuation value in her paper.

 

In fact she is confused about Vw. Vw should be the prize of winning.

 

 

 

 

2.

 

In her third letter, she said

*************

The hazard function which governs the duration of the current

technology is a function only of current investment; that is, h(x), where x

is the investment rate in the current race.

*******************

 

How does the hazard function govern the DURATION of the current technology?

This assertion is nonsense. The hazard function governs the beginning time of next

technology(ending time of the current technology). Hazard function governs the time not

the duration. Why don't you consider Reinganum’s wrong assertion. With only this one can

tell who is wrong.

 

 

********

The ***optimal*** value of

current investment is (in equilibrium) a function of the other parameters of

the model, including the continuation values of winning and losing the

current race (this is the expected discounted value of all the subsequent

races); that is, x* = f(vL, vW), where vL is the continuation value after

losing the current race and vW is the continuation value after winning the

current race. The next race's investment affects the duration of the

current technology only through these continuation values, not directly

through the hazard function for the current race. Since no precommitments

can be made, these continuation values summarize all relevant information

about future investments, and are taken as given (not subject to choice) in

the current stage. I believe that these continuation values are the

expectations to which you refer. Yes, one needs to determine these

expectations in order to calculate the optimal current investment rate; this

is done through dynamic programming backwards from the "last" race.

**********

 

I cannot understand what she says. She tries to protect her conclusion by making Vw

mysterious. I cannot understand her mysterious Vw.

 

Backward induction cannot deny the simple principle: All rational participants consider

the duration of the technology they are searching for. on the contrary backward induction

means that all rational participants consider the duration of the technology they are

searching for.

 

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